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Counting the Preamble and the signing statement at the bottom of page
four, the word the appears approximately 420 times in the United States
Constitution.1 The terms that the modifies are predictably varied—both
singular2 and plural,3 both uppercase4 and lowercase5—although they rarely
represent anything but grand concepts.6 Previously, scholars have engaged
in deep-rooted study of words in the Constitution that are just as short and
seemingly routine as the,7 not to mention analysis of even shorter, everyday
words by important constitutional actors.8 But until recently, the
constitutional the had not really gotten its due, its starring role, before the
January 2013 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Noel Canning v. NLRB.9 It was a long time coming
for the most common word in the English language.10 It’s just too bad it
was entirely unnecessary.
To claim the D.C. Circuit has caused a minor kerfuffle with its opinion
would be to bask in understatement. Here’s how the whole thing started: In
January 2012, President Obama made four appointments to executive
offices during what he termed a recess of the Senate,11 pursuant to his
power under Article II to unilaterally make such recess appointments.12 The
Court of Appeals determined that the appointments were invalid.13 But the
main problem wasn’t, as many had predicted, that the appointments
1

We counted, several times.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“the Time of chusing the Electors”).
3
See, e.g., id. passim (“the several States”).
4
See, e.g., id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (“the Punishment of Treason”).
5
See, e.g., id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“the best of my Ability”).
6
See, e.g., id. pmbl. (“the People”).
7
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 762 (1999) (finding
significance in attachment of the word all only to some of the categories of cases listed in Article III
and arguing that “[i]t is hardly to be presumed that the variation in the language could have been
accidental” (quoting Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334 (1816))).
8
Such as, for example, the President. See Timothy Noah, Bill Clinton and the Meaning of “Is,”
SLATE (Sept. 13, 1998, 9:14 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/1998/09/
bill_clinton_and_the_meaning_of_is.html (detailing President Clinton’s parsing of one of our shortest
verbs).
9
705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
10
See The OEC: Facts About the Language, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.
com/words/the-oec-facts-about-the-language (last visited Nov. 28, 2013) (putting the at the top of the
list of more than two billion words).
11
See Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Key
Administration Posts (Jan. 4, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/
04/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-posts (providing details of
recess appointments for three members of the National Labor Relations Board as well as the director of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
12
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their
next Session.”).
13
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 506–07.
2

380

108:379 (2014)

The Definite Article

occurred while the Senate had claimed not to be at recess.14 Instead, the
crux of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was that the appointments were bad
because they were made during the wrong recesses—i.e., those the Framers
did not contemplate when writing the Recess Appointments Clause.
This is where the comes in, and bear with me as I describe this chain
of logic. Though the court also made historical arguments favoring its
ultimate resolution of the case, its decision appeared to hinge on the fact
that, when the Framers wrote the Recess Appointments Clause in Article II,
they decided to include the word the in front of the words “Recess of the
Senate.”15 Citing a 1755 British dictionary to define the as “a particular
thing,”16 the court proclaimed that the Framers’ reference to “the Recess of
the Senate” leads to “the inescapable conclusion” that the Framers actually
meant “something different than a generic break in proceedings.”17 And
because the same clause refers to “Session[s]” of the Senate, the court
reasoned that the Recess obviously refers to breaks between those sessions.
Ergo, any presidential appointments not made during these specific
intersession breaks is illegitimate by the decree of the Framers. This ruled
out Obama’s 2012 appointments, which were ostensibly made during an
intrasession break not falling between two official Senate sessions. In other
words, the court decided it had “discovered, so to speak, the meaning of
‘the.’”18
The D.C. Circuit’s analysis is based on a reading of the constitutional
text that has been rejected by other courts of appeals both before and after
Noel Canning,19 and discounted even by some supporters of the ultimate
result.20 This Essay argues, more or less, that the court’s reading is
14

See Charlie Savage, Obama Tempts Fight over Recess Appointments, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS (Jan.
4, 2012, 4:34 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/obama-tempts-fight-over-recessappointments (describing the brouhaha involving the Senate’s “pro forma” sessions, in which one
senator would briefly gavel in and gavel out a session in front of an empty Senate chamber, and
Obama’s decision to use recess appointment power during said sessions).
15
See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 500 (“It is this difference between the word choice ‘recess’ and
‘the Recess’ that first draws our attention. . . . This is not an insignificant distinction. In the end it makes
all the difference.”).
16
2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2041 (London, W. Strahan
1755).
17
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 500.
18
Garrett Epps, What Did the Word ‘the’ Mean in 1755? And Why Does the Court Care?,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2013, 4:08 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/what-did-theword-the-mean-in-1755-and-why-does-the-court-care/272773.
19
See NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 228 (3d Cir. 2013) (concluding “that
use of ‘the’” in the Recess Appointments Clause “is uninformative” about when the Constitution allows
recess appointments); Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (same).
20
See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1561 n.225 (2005) (“While this textual inference has force, it is limited by the
fact that one can also read ‘the Recess of the Senate’ to cover multiple recesses. Under this view, the
recess of the Senate refers to the condition of the Senate being in a recess, not to the number of
recesses. Thus, it would mean whenever the Senate is in a recess.”); see also Mike Rappaport, Greve on
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absurd—or, at least, that it leads to absurd results. The D.C. Circuit relied
upon a single, incredibly common term, which alone betrays nothing, in
order to decide a constitutional case of the highest order. Of course, picking
on the D.C. Circuit’s exegesis on the could be characterized as simply
“criticizing the weakest case of one’s opponent,” which “is hardly the way
to convince informed people, even if it works well on the uninformed.”21
Ordinarily, that could be true. But here, it just so happens that the “weakest
case” of the court’s opinion is also the crux of its case: “In the end,” Chief
Judge David Sentelle wrote for the panel, the fact that the word the is in the
Recess Appointments Clause “makes all the difference.”22
Leave aside the fact that the decision could invalidate recess
appointments at least all the way back to the administration of Grover
Cleveland,23 not to mention all modern presidents.24 And forget the notion
that the result of the case disrupted a major agency25 and could call into
question many other agencies’ actions stretching back decades.26 Instead,
the Recess Appointments Decision, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Jan. 30, 2013, 7:48 AM), http://
originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2013/01/greve-on-the-recess-appointmentsdecisionmike-rappaport.html (allowing that “[t]he recess of the Senate in my view is somewhat
ambiguous—it could simply refer to the state of the Senate being in recess”).
21
Mike Rappaport, Eric Posner on the Recess Appointments Clause, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Mar. 21,
2013, 8:04 AM), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2013/03/eric-posner-on-therecess-appointments-clausemike-rappaport.html.
22
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 500.
23
See Budget of Recess Appointments, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1894, at 4 (noting several recess
appointments “to bear date September 7”); Recess Appointments, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1895, at 1
(noting President Cleveland had “sent to the Senate a number of recess appointments” that had “been
made since Congress adjourned” (emphasis added)). For a list of dates of sessions of Congress, see
Dates of Sessions of the Congress, Present–1789, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
Sessions/sessionDates.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
24
See Memorandum from Henry B. Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., to Members of Congress 3
(2013), available at http://democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/sites/democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/
files/documents/112/pdf/Recess%20Appointments%201981-2013.pdf (“If the court had issued its
decision in Noel Canning prior to January 20, 1981, it is possible that the President would have been
precluded from making many of the specific recess appointments listed in this memorandum.”).
25
See Carlyn Kolker, NLRB Pursuing Settlements, Despite Noel Canning Decision, REUTERS, May
16, 2013, available at WESTLAW, 5/16/13 REUTERS LEGAL 09:59:54 (“Forty-six cases involving the
board are currently being held in abeyance in the District of Columbia Circuit because of the Canning
decision, Paulsen said, and 38 cases have raised the issue of the Canning decision in other federal
circuits . . . .”). Admittedly, however, the NLRB itself has described this impact as “not paralyzing.” Id.
26
The NLRB has issued more than 600 decisions since the actual recess appointments in January
2012—all of which could be swept away if the Supreme Court affirms the D.C. Circuit in the coming
term after its recent grant of certiorari in the case. See Lyle Denniston, Recess Appointments Case Set,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 4, 2013, 3:51 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=164452; Valerie Eifert, No
Timeout in Recess Appointment Battle over NLRB’s Authority, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2013, 3:19 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theemploymentbeat/2013/03/13/no-timeout-in-recess-appointment-battleover-nlrbs-authority. But the court’s reasoning certainly stretches beyond January 2012 and could be
used as grounds to invalidate any decision made by any recess appointee since the Founding. Most
NLRB members for the last three decades have been recess appointees, as were Alan Greenspan and
countless other officials. See Garrett Epps, Let’s Stop Treating the Constitution Like The Da Vinci
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consider this: the decision on its own represents a prime example of a sort
of textual originalism run amok—a brand of legal reasoning in which the
reasoner searches for a meaning that cannot be discerned with certainty,
and yet presents its chosen meaning as “the only one faithful to the
Constitution’s text, structure, and history.”27 There are other problems with
Noel Canning, to be sure,28 but the was the key to it all—and the is where
its reasoning fails. This coming term, when the Supreme Court decides the
fate of Noel Canning, it could very well leave the D.C. Circuit’s analysis
unmolested. And grammarians everywhere would weep.
*

*

*

Noel Canning has already inspired fascinating scholarship29 and also
debates about grammar sure to delight any middle school English teacher.30
But while the colloquy over the court’s focus on the has even spilled over
from the law nerd blogs into popular media,31 the decision nonetheless calls
out for a bit more parsing, if only to fully comprehend its use of the
constitutional text—along with parts of the text that the court didn’t use.
After all, the court claimed to be able to determine “the natural meaning of
Code, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2013, 11:53 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/04/letsstop-treating-the-constitution-like-the-da-vinci-code/274946. In its petition for certiorari in Noel
Canning, the Solicitor General’s Office observed that American presidents have already made more
than 500 intrasession appointments and flatly warned that “similar reasoning [to the D.C. Circuit’s]
could threaten past and future decisions of other federal agencies.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
11–12, 17, NLRB v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281 (U.S. Apr. 25, 2013), 2013 WL 1771081.
27
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 505.
28
See, for example, the second half of the textual–historical analysis, focusing on the word happen
in the Recess Appointments Clause, id. at 507–14.
29
See, e.g., Peter Strauss, Reaction, The Pre-Session Recess, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 130 (2013),
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/126/february13/forum_992.php; Cass R. Sunstein, Reaction,
Originalism v. Burkeanism: A Dialogue over Recess, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 126 (2013), http://www.
harvardlawreview.org/issues/126/february13/forum_991.php; Adrian Vermeule, Reaction, Recess
Appointments and Precautionary Constitutionalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 122 (2013), http://www.
harvardlawreview.org/issues/126/february13/forum_990.php.
30
See, e.g., Lawrence Solum, Rappaport on Posner on Recess Appointments, LEGAL THEORY
BLOG (Mar. 21, 2013, 1:38 PM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2013/03/rappaport-on-posneron-recess-appointments.html (arguing that “[a] rolling stone gathers no moss” and “[t]he rolling stone
gathers no moss” help show whether a speaker is talking about a particular rolling stone (emphasis
added)).
31
See, e.g., Kevin Drum, DC Circuit Rules Obama Misused the Word “The,” MOTHER JONES (Jan.
25, 2013, 9:15 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/01/dc-circuit-court-rules-obamamisused-the; Dominic Perella, Is the President’s Recess Appointment Power Effectively Dead?,
MSNBC (Apr. 30, 2013, 2:01 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/04/30/presidential-recess-appointmentscould-be-coming-to-an-end; Eric Posner, Indefinite Articles, SLATE (Mar. 19, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/03/the_folly_of_originalism_
judges_should_stop_parsing_every_word_the_founders.single.html; Mark Silva, The Meaning of
“The”: Makes “All the Difference,” BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://go.bloomberg.com/
political-capital/2013-01-25/the-meaning-of-the-makes-all-the-difference.
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the text as it would have been understood at the time of the ratification of
the Constitution.”32 That sort of thing is all well and good, unless one has to
guess to do so.
To start, the Supreme Court’s precedents are of little help here, though
the Court has touched on the importance of the in the past. As early as
Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court observed that Congress’s power to regulate
commerce cannot be exclusive, as the Constitution states only that
“Congress shall have power” to do so, and not “the power.”33 But the Court
in Gibbons attached significance to the in this instance because it had
actually been deleted from earlier drafts of the Constitution; it concluded
the omission of the “was not accidental, but studiously made.”34 We have
no evidence of such deletions here, nor do we deal with a constitutional
area like federalism, where the Framers’ feelings were copiously
documented in contemporaneous accounts.35 Many years later, in Freytag
v. Commissioner,36 Justice Scalia in concurrence examined the presence of
the in the main Appointments Clause, which permits Congress to vest the
power to appoint inferior officers in “the Courts of Law.”37 There, Justice
Scalia wrote, “The definite article ‘the’ obviously narrows the class of
eligible ‘Courts of Law’ to those courts of law envisioned by the
Constitution.”38 These courts envisioned by the Constitution were easy to
find because the Framers conveniently promulgated them in Article III.
Sadly, we have no such explicit help with recesses. They, like
adjournments, are among several vital devices of government that the
Constitution mentions but does not define or create.39 Other cases are of
little help; none analyze the presence of the definite article in the
Constitution itself.
Without the assistance of helpful precedent, the D.C. Circuit in Noel
Canning turned instead to what it called “cold, unadorned logic” to
determine that the Constitution’s reference to the Recess pointed to a
specific recess, not some “generic break in proceedings.”40 It distinguished
the Recess from various references in the Constitution to adjournment,
which the court defined (without citation or reference) as “breaks in the

32

Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 500.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 85–86 (1824) (emphasis omitted).
34
Id. at 85.
35
See id. at 85–86.
36
501 U.S. 868 (1991).
37
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
38
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 902 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
39
The office of Chief Justice is another, and so is the concept of “militias,” the nondefinition of
which has been the subject of considerable judicial parsing in the past. See District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595–96 (2008).
40
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861
(2013).
33
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proceedings” of Congress.41 It then helpfully consulted Samuel Johnson’s
1750s dictionary, which defines the as a definite article, a “particular
thing.”42 Thus, the Recess means a recess that occurs between sessions of
Congress, because of the word the in front of it, but adjournments are other
breaks occurring at other times.
The court should have kept reading. Later in Article II, the
Constitution refers to the President’s power to disperse both houses of
Congress if they cannot agree upon “the Time of Adjournment.”43 Under
the D.C. Circuit’s strict definition of the, should we take the Constitution to
mean there can only be one “Time of Adjournment”? And if so, does that
mean an adjournment is the same thing as the Recess? Or that the Senate is
actually allowed to break only once per year? Answers are not
forthcoming.
Perhaps, then, there is something in the Constitution’s choice of article
itself that more credibly reveals intention. Recall first that the Court of
Appeals used a 1755 definition of the (“article noting a particular thing”) to
posit that, “[u]nlike ‘a’ or ‘an,’ that definite article suggests specificity.”44
But the same dictionary’s definition of a is not that different from its
definition of the. Samuel Johnson wrote that a is an article “denoting the
number one . . . that is, no more than one.”45 In other words, a also means
singular, or something particular. Based on 1755 definitions alone, which is
all the D.C. Circuit used here, there is no difference at all.
There are many more a uses in the Constitution that bring this
supposed distinction into sharper relief. If the is an indisputable signal from
the Framers, then it follows that indefinite articles must be statements of
inexactitude. The Constitution refers to “a President” multiple times in the
document; the Senate is to select “a President pro tempore,”46 and the
executive power is “vested in a President of the United States.”47 Perhaps
there can be multiple presidents pro tempore, or multiple presidents of the
United States? Of course not. But investing such insignificant words with
such momentous import is the sort of judicial construction that leads to
these questions.
*

*

*

41

Id. Never mind the possibility that a recess and an adjournment are both technically “breaks in
the proceedings of . . . Congress.” Id.; see Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004) (en
banc) (observing that the Supreme Court has defined recess and adjournment in similar ways).
42
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 500 (emphasis omitted) (quoting JOHNSON, supra note 16).
43
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
44
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 500 (emphasis omitted) (quoting JOHNSON, supra note 16).
45
1 JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 52.
46
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
47
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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Another curious feature of Noel Canning is that while the D.C. Circuit
provides a 1755 definition of the, it focuses little on definitions of the
words that the modifies: “recess” and “time of adjournment.” Turning back
to Samuel Johnson’s dictionary to define these words confuses the issue
further. To recess is merely to “retire[],” to “retreat,” to “withdraw[]”; a
“recess” is a “departure.”48 And to adjourn is not much different: outside of
the judicial context, it means “[t]o put off; to defer; to let stay to another
time.”49 In modern and historical practice, a recess could be either one of
these things, even an intrasession recess. There, senators do “retreat” and
“withdraw,” if only until “their next Session”;50 the same temporary
absence could just as easily be construed as “defer[ring]” national business
until senators return to Washington.
Further, one of the court’s main pieces of evidence actually blunts its
argument. In the midst of its textual analysis, the court points to the 1776
North Carolina state constitution, which “likely served as the [Recess
Appointment] Clause’s model,” as support for its interpretation.51 That
constitution “describes a singular recess,” the D.C. Circuit said, in that it
gives the governor the power to fill vacancies that occur “during their
recess”—their referring to the General Assembly.52 For those who had been
paying attention to this point, with the impression that the was the be-all,
end-all determinative word, this inclusion came as a surprise. Their is not
an article at all, but a possessive pronoun.53
How then could it possibly fit the court’s grammatical rubric? No
explanation was given, and there is evidence that other state governments
viewed the word recess for the purpose of recess appointments to mean
intrasession breaks.54 It may be that selective historical citation is the
hallmark of this type of textualism–originalism. When there are conflicting
historical examples, simply cite the one that helps and stop the discussion.
*

*

*

To its credit, though, the court in Noel Canning did signal that it was
aware of an alternate reading of these definitions. After all, the Eleventh
48

JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 236.
1 JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 81.
50
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
51
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861
(2013).
52
Id. (quoting N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XX, reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 406 (William F. Swindler ed., 1978)).
53
Turning again to Johnson: “their” means “[o]f them; the pronoun possessive from they.”
JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 421.
54
See NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 225–26 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing
practices of Vermont, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey prior to ratification).
49
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Circuit had already posited a plausible one, nine years earlier.55 But the
D.C. Circuit’s rejection of that reading was just as questionable. The exact
same arguments against intrasession recesses had been made in a case
challenging the recess appointment of Judge William Pryor to the Eleventh
Circuit.56 And that court, too, whipped out the dictionaries when the parties
challenging the judge’s appointment argued that the was determinative in
the Recess Appointments Clause—yet that court’s decision went the
opposite way:
We do not agree that the Framers’ use of the term “the” unambiguously points
to the single recess that comes at the end of a Session. Instead, we accept that
“the Recess,” originally and through today, could just as properly refer
generically to any one—intrasession or intersession—of the Senate’s acts of
recessing, that is, taking a break.57

As backup, the Eleventh Circuit cited two definitions of the that permit the
word to be used generically, one of which provided eighteenth-century
examples of usage.58 And that was the end of the matter.
In Evans v. Stephens,59 common sense in the context of our everyday
grammar made the the issue a nonissue. The court recognized that we often
use the when we mean to use a plural, or at least to reference vague,
inexact, or generic concepts, and that we did so at the time of the Framing,
too. It’s also easy to find examples in various modern sources: “Five major
factors have shaped the American city.”60 “The Apple user is an adrenaline
junky . . . .”61 “[T]he platypus is most interesting from a physiological point
of view . . . .”62 “And I’m hungry like the wolf.”63 And so on. One can’t
imagine it was much different around 1789. In fact, one can see it for
55

And let us also note here that the D.C. Circuit’s analysis was not exactly new. It was advanced
over a century earlier by Attorney General Philander C. Knox, who issued an opinion paper with the
exact same argument in 1901. See President—Appointment of Officers—Holiday Recess, 23 Op. Att’y
Gen. 599, 600–02 (1901) (“It will be observed that the phrase is ‘the recess.’ . . . [T]he recess means the
period after the final adjournment of Congress for the session, and before the next session begins.”).
Note Knox’s conflation of recess and adjournment, right there in that last sentence.
56
See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1221 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
57
Id. at 1224–25.
58
See id. at 1225 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1965 (2d ed.
1987) (the is “used to mark a noun as being used generically: the dog is a quadruped”); 17 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 879 (2d ed. 1989) (the “refer[s] to a term used generically or universally”)).
59
387 F.3d 1220.
60
Kenneth T. Jackson, A Nation of Cities: The Federal Government and the Shape of the American
Metropolis, 626 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 11, 14 (2009) (emphasis added).
61
Bianca Bosker, How Apple’s Losing Its Monopoly on Magic, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 6, 2013,
12:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/06/apple-future-monopoly-on-magic_n_2814015.
html (quoting MIT lecturer Howard Anderson) (emphasis added).
62
T.R. Grant & T.J. Dawson, Temperature Regulation in the Platypus, Ornithorhynchus Anatinus:
Maintenance of Body Temperature in Air and Water, 51 PHYSIOLOGICAL ZOOLOGY 1, 5 (1978)
(emphasis added).
63
DURAN DURAN, Hungry Like the Wolf, on RIO (EMI 1982) (emphasis added).
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oneself: “the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre,”64
“the cruel disposition of the British Court,”65 and so on again.
Yet the D.C. Circuit in Noel Canning chided the Eleventh Circuit for
daring to define the differently. It argued that the Eleventh Circuit in Evans
“underestimates the significance of the definite article ‘the’ preceding
‘Recess’ by relying on twentieth-century dictionaries.”66 Only
“[c]ontemporaneous dictionaries” will do, the court said, swatting away
definitions of the that didn’t fit its decision by claiming the definition of the
itself has changed.67 The court then quoted the same dictionary (not
multiple “[c]ontemporaneous dictionaries”) to prove its point that the
means “singular.”68
As of this past summer, however, the weight of the circuits fell against
this analysis. In May, the Third Circuit decided that the sheds no light at all
on the proper application of the Recess Appointments Clause. While the
court invalidated Obama’s recess appointments in NLRB v. New Vista
Nursing and Rehabilitation, it did so on grounds other than the—and went
out of its way to retire the idea that the provides any insight into what the
Framers intended here.69 The Third Circuit’s analysis was brief; it admitted
that a possible construction of the is that the word “refers to a specific
thing, possibly suggesting that recess refers to the one recess that follows
every session, an intersession break.”70 But the court proceeded to agree
with Evans, in that the Recess could “simply refer to times in which the
Senate is in a recess.”71 The bottom line was unmistakable: “There is
nothing that shows what ‘the’ means in the Recess Appointments Clause,
especially because the Constitution uses ‘the’ in several manners. . . .
Accordingly, we are convinced that use of ‘the’ is uninformative.”72
*

64

*

*

THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 88 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 67, 111 (Moncure Daniel
Conway ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1894) (emphasis added).
66
Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861
(2013).
67
Id.
68
Id. (citing JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 2041).
69
See 719 F.3d 203, 227–28 (3d Cir. 2013). The court decided against the NLRB and invalidated
the recess appointments. See id. at 208.
70
Id. at 227.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 227–28. It should also be noted that the Third Circuit chided those who would turn to mideighteenth-century dictionaries to decide major constitutional questions, noting that “[d]ictionaries from
the time of ratification provide definitions that can be read to support any” possible definition of recess.
Id. at 221.
65
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The greater point about all of this is, should we really decide such
momentous issues based on what one dictionary said in the 1750s versus
another––about the single-most common word in the English language?
Instead of reserving an originalist–textualist analysis for cases in which
there is actual evidence of the Framers’ thoughts and motivations, cases
like Noel Canning reach past history into darkness, counting words and
defining humdrum terms to arrive at some simulacrum of intent. This is
supposition as law.
Perhaps somewhat less importantly, should the Supreme Court affirm
the D.C. Circuit’s course of reasoning, recess appointments as presidents
have known them for decades will vanish. But can we live without them?
We have before. George W. Bush made his last recess appointments
on April 4, 2007, and there was not another one until Barack Obama took
office and made fifteen appointments to various offices during an
intrasession recess in March 2010.73 The country continued to function
without the appointments. Yet it may not have to live without these
appointments entirely. Those of us in the recess appointments
community—small as it is—are loath to admit a fairly feasible workaround based on Noel Canning. But there is one that will no doubt catch the
attention of future administrations, should Noel Canning remain good law.
Short of dying, or being ousted by scandal, most presidential appointees
choose when to leave office; after Noel Canning, they may simply choose
to do so during the next intersession recess.74 Pity the first unsuspecting
Congress that adjourns sine die, ending its official session and going home
for an intersession break,75 only to learn about a flood of resignations and
subsequent recess appointments—all of them intersession and thus just fine
under Noel Canning.
Should that happen, one hastens to imagine that the Senate would
quickly grow wise to this tactic. Though it is required to start and end
distinct sessions,76 the Senate might alter its schedule to permit no recess of
any appreciable time between these sessions. The President might then be
prompted to return to the brilliant and ridiculous “constructive-recess”
tactic of Theodore Roosevelt, who appointed scores of officers during what
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See Jeff VanDam, Comment, The Kill Switch: The New Battle over Presidential Recess
Appointments, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 361, 377 (2012) (detailing 2010 appointments).
74
See, e.g., Kathryn A. Wolfe & Burgess Everett, Ray LaHood to Resign from Obama
Administration, POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2013, 10:06 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/lahoodresignation-transportation-86859.html (outgoing Secretary of Transportation retiring, but not choosing
to “depart until his successor is confirmed, which gives the president some breathing room in selecting
a new leader”).
75
See Adjournment Sine Die, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/
adjournment_sine_die.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
76
“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first
Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2.
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he declared to be the infinitesimal moment—a “recess”—between two
contiguous sessions of Congress in 1903.77
Yet this is the sort of political absurdum ad infinitum that the D.C.
Circuit has invited in deciding Noel Canning on such grounds. It may only
too soon come to pass.
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See VanDam, supra note 73, at 370–71.

